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Abstract: Modal epistemic conditions have played an important role in 
post-Gettier theories of knowledge. These conditions purportedly 
eliminate the pernicious kind of luck present in all Gettier-type cases 
and offer a rather convincing way of refuting skepticism. This 
motivates the view that conditions of this sort are necessary for 
knowledge. I argue against this. I claim that modal conditions, 
particularly sensitivity and safety, are not necessary for knowledge. I 
do this by noting that the problem cases for both conditions point to a 
problem that cannot be fixed even by a revised similarity ranking or 
ordering of worlds. I offer as groundwork a set theoretical analysis of 
the profiles of the problem cases for safety and sensitivity. I then 
demonstrate that these conditions fail whenever necessary links 
constitutive of the epistemic situation actually obtain but are not 
modally preserved. 
 
Keywords: Gettier problem, sensitivity, safety, modal epistemic 
conditions 
 
Introduction 
 
The Gettier problem1 is exemplified in cases where (1) the subject 
could have easily believed otherwise and in instances where (2) the 
proposition that the subject believes could have easily been false. These 
features motivate the intuition that in these cases some sort of luck is involved: 
Given (1), the subject, it seems, only accidentally believes a true proposition; 
and given (2), the proposition that the subject believes seems only 
coincidentally true. In both instances we have a justified but luckily true belief. 
Some epistemologists believe that this intuition is modal in nature: 
that ‘S accidentally believes p’ is explained by the intuition that there is a 
                                                 
1 Gettier famously challenged the tripartite definition of knowledge, which requires 
the justified true belief (JTB) conditions, by citing two cases that, he claims, are not instances of 
knowledge, but in which all three conditions are satisfied. See Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True 
Belief Knowledge?” Analysis, 23 (1963), 121-123. 
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possible world where S believes otherwise, while ‘that p is accidentally true’ 
is explained by the intuition that there is a possible world where p is false. 
Epistemologists who endorse this view usually drop the justification 
requirement of knowledge and replace it with a condition that is supposed to 
guarantee the connection between a person’s justification for believing a 
proposition and the truth of the proposition he or she believes.  It is assumed 
that such condition guarantees a stronger connection between S’s justification 
for believing p and the truth of p. If correct, this would mean that in any 
instance of knowledge, S would not have easily believed otherwise, and that 
p would not have easily been false. Or, in modal terms, that in nearby possible 
worlds, S would still believe that p and p would still be true. What these 
epistemologists propose is a counterfactual or modal analysis of knowledge 
that requires counterfactual or modal conditions.  
I argue here that modal conditions, particularly sensitivity and 
safety, are not necessary for knowledge. I do this by examining the profiles of 
problem cases for sensitivity and safety, noting that these cases actually point 
to a more serious problem than that of having a vague world-similarity 
criterion. I ground my argument on an analysis that treats the epistemic 
situation as a set which members are necessarily linked. I claim that these 
conditions fail whenever these necessary links that are constitutive of 
epistemic situations actually obtain but are not modally preserved. 
 
Modal Epistemic Conditions 
 
Robert Nozick2 offers the following as necessary conditions for 
knowing:  
 
C1: If p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p. 
(Variation condition) 
C2: If p were true, S would believe it. (Adherence 
condition) 
 
C1 and C2 require sensitivity to the truth-value of the proposition. These 
conditions ask us to consider the status of the belief in situations that would 
obtain if the proposition is false, and if it remains true. Nozick requires that 
the belief be made sensitive to the truth-value of the proposition, such that if 
the proposition were false, the subject would not have believed it, and if the 
proposition remained true in a slightly different situation, the subject would 
have believed it still.  
                                                 
2 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1981). 
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Sosa,3 on the other hand, offers the following conditions as an 
alternative to Nozick’s sensitivity condition:4  
 
C3:  S would believe that p only if it were so that p.  
 
Or alternatively, 
  
C4:  S would not believe that p without it being the 
case that p. 
 
C3 requires us to check close possible worlds where the subject believes the 
proposition and see if in those worlds the proposition that the subject believes 
is true. Or close possible worlds where the subject does not believe the 
proposition and see if in those worlds the proposition is false (C4).  
   
Profiles of Sensitivity and Safety Counterexamples 
 
I categorize problem cases for sensitivity and safety into three types: 
 
(1) A-TYPE:5 S has strong justification for believing p and 
p is true.  
 
A-type cases involve a subject who has a strong justification for believing a 
true proposition, which makes his or her belief strongly justified. Justification 
is strong if the subject’s evidence is almost conclusive. I place under this 
category the problem cases offered by Vogel and later Sosa, Gellman, and 
Briggs and Nolan.6 In A-type cases, the subject’s belief is internally justified, 
insofar as the subject has access to the evidence that supports his or her belief. 
And as far as there are no (actual) defeaters in the description of the case, A-
type beliefs are actually undefeated. Thus, in the actual world, the belief is both 
                                                 
  3 Ernest Sosa, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13 
(1999), 141-153.  
4 The safety condition is strikingly similar to Nozick’s conditions. However, they are 
not logically equivalent since contraposition is invalid for counterfactuals.   
5 For a more extensive discussion of these cases see Mark Anthony Dacela, “Where 
Sensitivity Don’t Work,” Suri, 6:2 (2017), 110-123. 
6 For instance, see counterexamples which may be dubbed as the following: (1) 
“Garbage Chute” in Jonathan Vogel, “Tracking, Closure, and Inductive knowledge,” in The 
Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and his Critics, ed. by Luper-Foy Steven (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1987) and Ernest Sosa, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical 
Perspectives, 13 (1999), 141-153; (2) “Mars” see Jerome Gellman, “A New Gettier Type of 
Refutation of Nozick’s Analysis of Knowledge,” Principia, 8:1 (2004), 279-283, and (3) “Mad,” (4) 
“Bad,” and (5) “Dangerous” in Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan, “Mad, bad and dangerous to 
know,” Analysis, 72:2 (2012), 314-316.  
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internally justified and undefeated, such that no contrary evidence is given 
or accessible to the subject. Proponents of these counterexamples count as 
close worlds those in which the subject holds the same evidence, so the actual 
belief-characteristics are extended to these worlds. Worlds in which the 
subject does not believe the proposition are excluded from the set of relevant 
worlds, while worlds in which the proposition is true and the subject believes it 
are counted as close. A-type beliefs then turn out to be insensitive, but safe. 
 
(2) B-TYPE: S forms belief p via method m, m is 
conditionally reliable (m is unreliable in a possible 
circumstance r that almost obtained) and p is true.  
 
B-type cases involve a subject who forms his or her belief using a conditionally 
reliable method. A method is conditionally reliable if in case there is a possible 
circumstance where it fails to be reliable. I place under this category problem 
cases offered by Baumann, Neta and Rohrbaugh, Cosmeña, and Freitag.7 In 
these cases, the subject is unaware of the method’s conditional reliability. B-
type beliefs are internally justified but are factually defeated. Factual defeaters 
are true propositions that are unknown to the subject at the time he or she 
forms his or her belief. The presence of factual defeaters generates two analyses 
for B-type beliefs: (1) they are either taken as internally justified but almost 
defeated or (2) internally justified and undefeated. It all depends on how 
serious one takes the threat of factual defeat. Proponents of these 
counterexamples count worlds in which the subject holds the same evidence 
so the belief-characteristics extend to close possible worlds. However, if (1), 
then the set of close worlds include those in which S’s belief is defeated. If (2), 
then the set excludes them. If (1), B-type beliefs are insensitive and unsafe; if 
(2), they are insensitive but safe. 
 
(3) C-TYPE: S forms his or her belief p via method m with 
unstable reliability (at any time t method m is 
unreliable), and p is true.  
 
C-type cases involve a subject who forms his or her belief using a method that 
has unstable reliability. A method’s reliability is unstable if at any time it can 
be unreliable. I place under this category the problem case offered by 
                                                 
7 See counterexamples that may be called the following (1) “Mask” in Peter Baumann, 
“Is Knowledge Safe?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 45:1 (2008), 19-30; (2) “Water” and (3) 
“Flashes” in Ram Neta and Guy Rohrbaugh, “Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly, 85 (2004), 396-406; (4) “Halloween” in Juan Comesaña, “Unsafe 
knowledge,” Synthese, 146 (2005), 395-404; (5) “3/6 Clock” in Wolfgang Freitag, “Safety, 
Sensitivity and ‘Distant’ Epistemic Luck,” Theoria, 80:1 (2014), 44-61. 
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Bogardus.8 In these cases, the subject is internally justified but factually 
defeated: he or she is not aware that reliability of his or her belief-forming 
method is unstable. C-type beliefs are internally justified but factually 
defeated. Proponents of these counterexamples count as close worlds those 
worlds in which the subject holds the same evidence, so the belief-
characteristics are extended to these worlds. Relevant worlds include worlds 
in which the subject holds a justified and true belief but is factually defeated, 
and worlds in which he or she holds a justified false belief. Worlds in which 
the subject does not believe the proposition are not considered relevant. C-
type beliefs are insensitive and unsafe.  
 
Epistemic Situation and its Constitutive Links: Preliminary Analysis 
 
Close Epistemic Worlds and the Ceteris Paribus Set 
 
One of the problems for sensitivity and safety is the seeming lack of 
a clear, nonarbitrary similarity criterion or closeness ranking that determines 
which worlds are similar or close. Counterexamples to safety and sensitivity 
capitalize on this deficiency and demonstrate very clearly how it questions 
the warrantedness of these views. The problem in brief is that if the criterion 
is too strict, say, we consider close worlds only those that are exactly similar 
to the actual world, then they become trivial conditions. Given such a 
criterion, the actual world would be the only world included in the set of close 
worlds. If the criterion is not strict but too narrow, say, we consider close 
worlds only those in which certain epistemic details similarly obtain while 
other nonepistemic details vary,  then some relevant worlds will not be 
included in the set of close worlds; also, this set will be limited to worlds that 
only differ in terms of some epistemically irrelevant facts. If the criterion is 
too broad, then it fails to properly discriminate between worlds. It seems then 
that whichever criterion we take these conditions to have, there would be 
problem cases.  
To appreciate the problem, let’s make a distinction between close 
epistemic worlds and close worlds in general.9 Initially, we can take the former as 
a subset of the latter: a close epistemic world is a close world, but not all close 
worlds are close epistemic worlds. What are close worlds? These are worlds 
                                                 
8 Bogardus, for instance, offered his “Atomic Clock” counterexample. See Tomas 
Bogardus, “Knowledge Under Threat,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88:2 (2014): 289-
313. 
9 For a more thorough discussion of the modal semantics at work in both sensitivity 
and safety, see Robert Stalnaker, “A Theory of Conditionals,” in Studies in Logical Theory, ed. by 
Nicholas Rescher (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), 98-112 and David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1973). 
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similar to the actual world. All other things being equal, a world where I am 
typing on my computer is close to the actual world where I am doing the exact 
same thing. However, there are many possible worlds in which I am typing on 
my computer:  
 
(1) Worlds in which I am drinking coffee while 
typing on my computer.  
(2) Worlds in which I am drinking soda while 
typing on my computer. 
 
Which one is closer? To further limit the members of the set of close possible 
worlds, we need to identify more details, or facts that actually obtain. Suppose 
that in the actual world, I am drinking coffee while typing on my computer. 
If this is the case, then (1) is closer than (2). That is, all the other details being 
equal, worlds in which I am drinking coffee are closer to the actual world 
than those in which I am drinking soda. Hence, to determine which worlds 
are close, you need to identify what facts actually obtain. To limit the ceteris 
paribus set, or the set of details you take as equal across worlds, you have to 
qualify your description of the world in a way that identifies more details. If 
your description of the actual world is too general, then more worlds will be 
included in the set of close worlds. If you further qualify your description, 
then the members will be fewer. After enumerating the details that describe 
the actual world, it is important to identify which details you will include in 
the ceteris paribus set. You have to consider what things should be equal across 
worlds. If we exclude in the ceteris paribus set “drinking coffee,” then both (1) 
and (2) are close worlds. But if we include this detail in the ceteris paribus set, 
then the set only includes (1). This briefly demonstrates how a similarity 
criterion can be seen as either arbitrary or trivial.  
However, sensitivity and safety theories ask us to track not just any 
close worlds but close epistemic worlds, or those worlds in which the actual 
epistemic situation similarly obtains. Identifying these worlds requires that we 
describe the actual epistemic situation: the actual set of epistemically relevant 
details. However, the criterion problem also manifests here, for we still need 
to determine which of these epistemically similar worlds are close. 
 
Constitutive Epistemic Links 
 
I find it helpful in this analysis to think of a given epistemic situation 
as a set of epistemically relevant details. Take these details as the usual things 
epistemologists identify when they describe epistemic cases: the subject who 
believes the proposition, his or her belief, the evidence that led him or her to 
form his or her belief, his or her belief-forming method, the fact (or facts) that 
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make the proposition true (or false), and the proposition the subject accepts 
(some cases also include defeaters). I am not claiming that this list is complete, 
but a typical description of an epistemic case identifies some or all of these 
details. These details are linked together and constitute an epistemic 
situation.  
 ‘Evidence’ (e) refers to the things that led to the formation of the 
belief. Such that, given e, the subject forms belief p: 
 
e → Bsp 
 
While ‘fact’ (f) refers to a particular state of affairs that makes the proposition 
either true or false:  
 
f → p  
 
But e can also be though of as a set of particular evidences. Given set {e}, the 
subject forms belief p: 
 
(a) {e} → Bsp 
 
Given (a), members of set {e} are necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
subject to form the belief (let ‘→’ stand for implication and {} to the given set):  
 
 [{e} → Bsp] → [ ~{e} → ~Bsp]. [{e} → Bsp] 
 
Similarly, (f) can be thought of as a set of particular facts. Given set {f}, p is 
true: 
 
(b) {f} → p 
 
Given (b), members of set {f} are necessary and sufficient to make the 
proposition true:   
 
 [{f} → p] → [~{f} → ~p]. [{f} → p] 
  
This brief analysis makes explicit two very important features of an epistemic 
situation: (1) the subject’s evidence for believing something is necessarily 
linked to the formation of his or her belief, and (2) facts that actually obtain 
are necessarily linked to the truth value of a proposition. Treating evidence 
and facts as sets will help demonstrate what these features imply about 
epistemic situations and the way we think about close epistemic worlds.  
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Set Relations of Evidence and Facts 
 
It seems to me that the set of evidence and the set of facts have three 
possible relations. First, it is possible that all members of the given set of 
evidence are members of the given set of relevant facts (the term ‘relevant’ 
indicates that only facts that make the proposition true are included in this 
set) and vice versa. In this case, set E and set F are equivalent sets (let “=” 
represent this set relationship, and let the letters inside {} stand for the 
members of the set and the letters outside {} for the name of the set):  
 
 R1: E {a, b, c} = F {a, b, c}  
 
If R1 is the case, then to include in the ceteris paribus set (let * stand for this set) 
the set of evidence is to include the set of facts. In other words, given R1, if all 
the members of set E are members of set *, then all members of set F are also 
members of set *:  
 
[{(E = F). *{E}]→ *{F} 
 
Conversely, if all members of set F are members of set *, then, given R1, all 
members of set E are members of set *:  
 
[(E = F). * {E}] → *{F} 
 
So, if the given set of evidences imply that the subject believes the proposition 
and the given set of facts implies that the proposition is true (in other words, 
if the members of each set are necessary and sufficient conditions for either 
Bsp or p to obtain), then, given R1, in a possible world in which all the 
evidences included in set E obtain, and those worlds in which all the facts 
included in set F obtain, the subject believes the proposition and the 
proposition is true (Let ‘#’ indicate that the given equation obtains in a 
possible world where either E or F obtains): 
 
[(E=F).(E → Bsp). (F→p)] → [#(E.Bsp.p). #(F.Bsp.p)] 
 
Second, there may also be instances where no member of the given set of 
evidence is a member of the given set of relevant facts. In this case set E and 
set F are complement sets (let ‘–’ indicate that these sets are exclusive: 
 
R2 E {a,b,c} – F {d,e,f} 
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If R2 is the case, then if only members of E are included in the ceteris paribus 
set, then members of F are excluded from this set (recall: ‘*’ refers to the ceteris 
paribus set):  
  
  [(E – F). * {E}] → ~ [*{F}] 
 
Conversely, given R2, if only members of F are included in set *, then members 
of E are excluded:  
 
[(E – F). * {F}] →  ~ [* {E}] 
  
So, if the given set of evidence implies that the subject believes the proposition 
and the given set of relevant facts implies that the proposition is true, then, 
given R2, in a possible world in which only set E obtains, the subject believes 
the proposition and the proposition is false; and in a possible world in which 
only set F obtains, the proposition is true but the subject does not believe it: 
 
[(E – F). (E→Bsp). (F→p)] → [#(E.Bsp. ~ p). #(F.~ Bsp. p)] 
 
Lastly, it can also be the case that some members of either set are members of 
the other set. It may be the case that some members of the set of evidence are 
members of the set of facts and vice versa. In these cases, these sets are subsets 
of the other set (let ‘⊂’ represent this relation): 
 
R3: E {a, b,} ⊂ F {a, b, c} v F {a, b,} ⊂ E {a, b, c} 
  
If set E is a subset of set F, then only members of set E are included in the 
ceteris paribus set, some but not all members of set F will also be included, so 
set F is excluded:  
 
[(E ⊂ F). * {E}] → ~ [* {F}] 
  
If set F is a subset of E, include set F in the ceteris paribus set, and some but not 
all members of set E are included, so set E is excluded: 
 
[(F ⊂ E). * {F}] → ~ [* {E}] 
  
Thus, if the given set of evidence implies that the subject believes the 
proposition, and the given set of relevant facts implies that the proposition is 
true, then, if set E is a subset of F (all members of E are members of F but E 
and F are not equivalent sets), in a possible world in which only set E obtains, 
the subject believes the proposition and the proposition is false, and in a 
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possible world in which only set F obtains, the proposition is true and the 
subject believes it: 
 
[(E ⊂ F). (E → Bsp). (F→p)] → [#(E.Bsp. ~p). #(F.Bsp.p)] 
 
And if set F is a subset of E, (all members of F are members of E but E and F 
are not equivalent sets), in a possible world in which only members of set F 
obtains, the proposition is true but the subject does not believe it, and in a 
possible world in which only set E obtains, the proposition is true and the 
subject believes it: 
 
[(F ⊂ E). (E → Bsp). (F→p)] → [#(F.~Bsp.p). #(E.Bsp.p)] 
 
Why Modal Conditions Fail? 
 
Identifying the necessary links and their implications in the way we 
think about epistemic situations and close epistemic worlds will help us explain 
why sensitivity and safety fail in the case profiles we identified earlier. 
 
A-Type Cases 
 
Recall that in A-type cases, the subject is strongly justified in 
believing a true proposition. A-type beliefs are insensitive but safe.  A-type 
beliefs are internally justified. There is nothing in the subject’s set of evidence 
(set E) that makes the proposition that he or she accepts false: there’s nothing 
in E that is contrary to p. Also in the actual world, the belief is undefeated, 
since the set of given facts (set F) makes the proposition true.  
Proponents of these counterexamples claim that A-type beliefs are 
insensitive since in close worlds in which p is false, the subject still believes it. 
Recall that the variation condition of sensitivity requires us to check close not-
p worlds and see if in those worlds the subject does not believe the same 
proposition. What worlds are these? This should at least include worlds in 
which a similar epistemic situation obtains. The latter pertains to the set that 
includes the same subject, belief, method, evidence, facts, and proposition. 
The ceteris paribus set is then limited to worlds in which the subject is in a 
similar epistemic situation. We cannot include in this set the relevant facts that 
actually obtain, since we are checking for close worlds in which the 
proposition is false. If we include the set of relevant facts (set F) in the ceteris 
paribus set, then the worlds we will identify are worlds in which the 
proposition is true.  
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If the set of relevant facts make the proposition true:  
 
F → p 
 
Then in worlds in which set F obtains, p is true. So we are looking for worlds 
in which the subject’s epistemic situation is similar to his or her actual 
epistemic situation, except, in this possible situation, set F does not obtain. It 
seems then that sensitivity requires us to look for worlds in which, except for 
set F, everything else that actually obtains, obtains. If set E is taken to include 
everything that led to the formation of the belief, the ceteris paribus set only 
includes set E. But if the subject’s set of evidence implies that the subject 
accepts the proposition (E→Bsp), then if only members of set E are included 
in the ceteris paribus set, excluding all members of set F, in all these ‘close’ 
worlds, the subject falsely believes the proposition (Bsp. ~p):  
 
[(E – F). (E → Bsp). (F→p). *{E}] → #(E.Bsp. ~p)  
 
As a result, A-type beliefs are insensitive. Note that set E and F are taken here 
as complement sets.  
Sensitivity theorists have two possible moves here: either they claim 
that A-type beliefs do not qualify as knowledge because they are insensitive, 
thus accepting the result, or they can show that A-type beliefs are sensitive. 
Either way, sensitivity will have serious problems. Let’s examine these 
moves.  
First, note that A-type beliefs are fallible beliefs. Call a belief “fallible” 
if and only if the subject’s evidence for accepting or believing a proposition is 
compatible with the proposition being false. The evidence does not guarantee 
the truth of the proposition. In cases of this sort, the set of evidence is not 
equivalent to the set of relevant facts. If these two are equivalent sets, then it is 
impossible for the proposition to be false, given the same set of evidence. 
Thus, sensitivity theorists can take A-type beliefs as having either 
complementary E and F sets, or E and F subsets. They can either think of them 
as beliefs that are formed within an epistemic circumstance in which the 
subject’s evidence is completely different from the relevant facts that make the 
proposition true, or formed within an epistemic circumstance in which some 
of the subject’s evidence are included in the set of particular facts that makes the 
proposition true. So if in the actual world the subject has a fallible belief, then 
the set relations of E and F are either (recall ‘@’ indicates that the sets obtain 
in the actual world):  
 
Complement Sets (R2): @ E {a,b,c} – F {x,y,z}; or 
Subsets (R3): @ E {a, b} ⊂ F {a, b, c} v F {a, b, c} ⊂ E {a, b,} 
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If they are complement sets, then if set E but not set F is included in the ceteris 
paribus set, so that in “close worlds” the subject falsely believes the 
proposition:  
 
[(E – F).( (E → Bsp). (F→p). * {E}] → #(E.Bsp. ~p) 
 
So A-type beliefs and all fallible beliefs will always be insensitive.  
If they are subsets, you still have to exclude all the members of set F 
in the ceteris paribus set, otherwise p will obtain instead of not ~p (remember 
that sensitivity requires us to check worlds in which not ~p obtains). But you 
can include members of F that are members of E (given that all the members 
of F are necessary and sufficient conditions for p). In which case, the ceteris 
paribus set is the intersection of set E and F (recall:‘∩’ represent this relation):  
 
* {E ∩ F} 
 
If this is taken as the ceteris paribus set, then in ‘close possible worlds’, the 
subject does not believe the proposition, and the proposition is false. In those 
worlds, not all members of set E and F obtain, and given that E is a necessary 
condition for the subject’s believing the proposition, and F is a necessary 
condition for the proposition being true: 
 
[(E ⊃ F) (E → Bsp). (F→p). * {E ∩ F}] → # [{E ∩ F}. ~Bsp. ~p]  
 
So A-type beliefs and all fallible beliefs will always be sensitive.   
Thus, if sensitivity theorists want to claim that A-type beliefs are 
insensitive, then they would have to think of sets E and F as complement sets 
(R2) in A-type cases. If they claim that A-type beliefs are sensitive, then they 
would have to think of these sets as subsets (R3) in A-type cases. If in A-type 
cases E and F are complement sets, then fallible beliefs are always sensitive. If in 
A-type cases E and F are subsets, then fallible beliefs are always insensitive.  
If fallible beliefs are always insensitive, and only sensitive beliefs 
qualify as knowledge, then all justified fallible beliefs, i.e., beliefs with evidential 
support but possibly false, do not qualify as knowledge. These include those 
that are strongly justified, or beliefs with strong evidential support. But if these 
beliefs do not qualify as knowledge, then beliefs in ordinary propositions like 
“I have hands” also do not qualify as knowledge; these beliefs are fallible. 
This contradicts claim that these propositions are sensitive.10 
                                                 
10 See Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 181. 
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If fallible beliefs are always sensitive, then Gettiered beliefs, which are 
justified fallible beliefs, are sensitive beliefs. Sensitivity theorists will then be 
forced to accept as knowledge the very beliefs they had intended to disqualify 
as knowledge.  
Proponents of safety claim that A-type beliefs are safe since in close 
worlds in which p is true, the subject believes the proposition. What worlds 
are these? Note that, unlike in the case of sensitivity, we are checking worlds 
in which the subject believes that proposition. So we have to include set E in 
the ceteris paribus set. Given that E implies that the subject believes the 
proposition:  
 
(E → Bsp ) → #(E→Bsp)] 
 
But what about the set of relevant facts, i.e., set F? Should F be included in the 
ceteris paribus set? It seems that it should be included. If not, then in all ‘close 
worlds’ the subject falsely believes the proposition. All A-type beliefs are 
unsafe:  
 
[(E – F).(E→ Bsp). (F→p). *{F}] → [#(F.Bsp. ~p)]  
 
And this is not the result safety theorists have in mind. But even if we suppose 
that they do accept this result. If all A-type beliefs are unsafe, and safety is a 
necessary requirement for knowledge, then all justified fallible beliefs do not 
qualify as knowledge, same problems with sensitivity.  
However, you cannot also include both E and F in the ceteris paribus 
set. If you do, then all A-type beliefs will be safe (including Gettiered beliefs). 
Since in ‘close worlds’, worlds in which E and F obtain, the subject truly 
believes p:  
 
[(E – F). (E → Bsp). (F→p). *{F.E}] → # (F. E. Bsp. p) 
 
Moreover, if both E and F are included in the ceteris paribus set, then the actual 
world will be the only member of the set of close worlds, unless worlds that 
only vary in some epistemically irrelevant details are included in this set: 
worlds in which both E and F obtain and some nonepistemic circumstance 
vary. This move will make safety a trivial condition.  
There’s another way: include in the ceteris paribus set only members 
of set E that are also members of F. In other words, the intersection of set E 
and F (recall: ‘∩’ represents this relation, and ‘*’ indicates that the set obtains 
in the actual world):  
 
* {E ∩ F}  
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Note that if this is done, then it is supposed that the epistemic situation in A-
type cases is such that E and F are subsets, for if they are equivalent sets, then 
the ceteris paribus set will include all members of both sets, and if they are 
complement sets then ceteris paribus set will be an empty set. But, if the ceteris 
paribus set only includes the intersection of E and F, then in ‘close worlds’ the 
subject does not believe false proposition p, given that set E implies the 
subject’s belief and F implies that the proposition is true:  
 
[(E – F).(E → Bsp). (F→p). *{E ∩ F}] → #[{E ∩ F}. ~Bsp. ~p)] 
 
But safety requires us to track worlds in which the subject believes the 
proposition, and not worlds in which he or she did not. This move, again, 
trivializes safety.  
 
B-type and C-type Cases 
 
Recall that B-type beliefs are either internally justified but almost 
defeated or internally justified and undefeated, depending on how serious 
the threat of factual defeat is taken to be (recall: a belief is factually defeated if 
and only if unknown to the subject, there is a true proposition that defeats his 
or her belief). Meanwhile, in C-type cases the subject’s belief-forming method 
has unstable reliability since at any time it can fail to produce a true belief. 
The factual defeater in B-type and C-type cases is the true proposition, “my 
method is conditionally reliable.” The dilemma comes in two ways: (1) if the 
subject had known that his or her belief forming method is conditionally 
reliable then he or she would not have believed the proposition, and (2) if it 
had been the case that the given circumstance is such that it makes the 
subject’s belief-forming method unreliable, he or she would have falsely 
believed the proposition. Note that in both cases, nothing actually defeats the 
subject’s belief. That his or her method is conditionally reliable, does not take 
away the fact that it actually works, given the subject’s actual circumstance. 
The conditional reliability of the subject’s belief forming method does not 
necessarily make the proposition false. It also does not make the subject’s 
belief any less justified, since it is unknown to him or her that the method is 
conditionally reliable.  
So how do we determine the worlds close to the actual world in 
which these cases obtain? Proponents of this counterexample seem to suggest 
that given the conditional reliability of the subject’s belief-forming method, the 
‘closest’ worlds are those in which the method fails to produce a true belief. If 
this is the case, the belief is unsafe. On the other hand, safety theorists can 
argue that (if the move is to hold that these beliefs are safe) the “close worlds” 
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are those in which the threat of epistemic defeat is also unrealized, given that 
that threat is unrealized in the actual world. So, the question really is whether 
or not the fact that there is an unrealized but potential threat of epistemic defeat in 
the actual world makes possible worlds in which that threat is realized relevantly 
close.  
To answer this, let us ask first if this unrealized but potential threat is 
included in the set of the subject’s evidence or the set of relevant facts that 
make the proposition true. Do we treat it as part of the evidence that led to 
the formation of the subject’s belief or as a particular fact that makes the 
proposition false? Safety theorists can claim that such a threat cannot be 
considered as part of the subject’s evidence for two reasons. First, the subject 
does not even know that threat exists. Second, the fact that the threat is 
unrealized does not have anything to do with the formation of the subject’s 
belief—he would have formed the same belief even if it were realized. On the 
other hand, the proposition would have been false if the threat were realized. 
So, that in the given circumstance the threat is unrealized, is a relevant fact 
that makes the proposition true.  
If safety theorists treat this unrealized threat as a member of the set of 
relevant facts, B-type beliefs will turn out safe, but not without trivializing 
safety. Note two things. First, like A-type beliefs, these beliefs are justified 
fallible beliefs. The subject’s evidence is compatible with the proposition being 
false. Second, also like in A-type cases, sets E and F in B-type and C-type cases 
are not equivalent sets: case in point, the unrealized threat which is included in 
set F is excluded in set E. So either they are complement sets or subsets: 
 
Complement Sets (R2): @ E {a,b,c} – F {x,y,z}; or 
Subsets (R3): @ E {a, b} ⊂ F {a, b, c} v F{a, b} ⊂ E {a, b,c} 
 
If they are complement sets, then if set E but not set F is included in the ceteris 
paribus set, in ‘close worlds’ (recall that this is the set of the things we hold 
equal across worlds) the subject falsely believes the proposition (recall ‘–’ 
indicates that the given sets are complement sets):  
 
[(E – F). ( (E→Bsp). (F→p). *{E}] → # (E.Bsp.  ~p) 
 
Fallible beliefs will always be unsafe. If they are subsets, and the intersection 
of sets E and F is included, then in ‘close worlds’ the subject does not believe 
the proposition and the proposition is false, since not all members of both sets 
obtain in these worlds: 
 
[(E ⊃ F) (E → Bsp). (F→p). * {E ∩ F}] → #[{E ∩ F}.~Bsp. ~p]  
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Fallible Beliefs will Always be Unsafe 
 
Now notice that safety theorists have to include set E in the ceteris 
paribus set, since safety requires us to check for worlds in which the subject 
believes the proposition, and E implies that the subject believes the 
proposition:  
 
(E → Bsp ) → #(E.Bsp) 
 
Set F also have to be included, otherwise, given that not-F implies that the 
proposition is false, in all ‘close worlds’ the subject falsely believes the 
proposition. So all B-type and C-type beliefs are unsafe:  
 
 [(E – F). (E → Bsp). (F→p). *{F}] → #(E.Bsp. ~p) 
 
However, both E and F cannot be included in the ceteris paribus set; otherwise, 
all fallible beliefs will be safe (including Gettiered beliefs). Since in ‘close 
worlds’, worlds in which E and F obtain, the subject truly believe p:  
 
 [(E – F).(E → Bsp). (F→p). *{F.E}] → #(F.E. Bsp. p)  
 
And again, if both E and F are included in the ceteris paribus set, then the actual 
world will be the only member of the set of close worlds, unless those worlds 
that only vary in some epistemically irrelevant details are included in this set 
(recall that these are worlds in which both E and F obtain and some non-
epistemic circumstance vary).  
Another move is to include in the ceteris paribus set the intersection of 
set E and F (recall: ‘∩’ represents this relation, and ‘#’ indicates that the set 
obtains in the actual world):  
 
 # {E ∩ F}  
 
But, if the ceteris paribus set only includes this, then in ‘close worlds’ the 
subject does not believe false proposition p. And, as I already explained in my 
analysis of A-type cases, this move trivializes safety:  
 
 [(E – F).(E → Bsp). (F→p).  *{E ∩ F}] → #[{E ∩ F}.~Bsp. ~p] 
 
Similar to my analysis of A-type beliefs, sensitivity theorists cannot claim that 
B-type and C-type beliefs are sensitive without either accepting that all 
fallible beliefs are sensitive or that all fallible beliefs are false. They cannot 
include both E and F in the ceteris paribus set, and they cannot limit this set to 
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all members of set F. Both moves will trivialize sensitivity. If they include E 
only, in ”close worlds,” the subject falsely believes the proposition. So B-type 
and C-type beliefs and all fallible beliefs will always be insensitive, including 
our beliefs in ordinary propositions like ‘I have hands’. If they limit the ceteris 
paribus set to the intersection of both sets, in ‘close worlds’ the subject does 
not believe the proposition, and the proposition is false. So B-type and C-type 
beliefs and all fallible beliefs are always sensitive, including Gettiered beliefs.  
 
Not Just a Criterion Problem 
 
The above analysis demonstrates why sensitivity and safety simply 
do not work in A-type, B-type, and C-type cases, but we can also extend the 
findings here to all fallible beliefs, or beliefs which evidential features are 
compatible with the falsity of its propositional object. Sensitivity and safety 
theorists cannot consistently claim that these beliefs do not qualify as 
knowledge, since they accept that at least some fallible beliefs do qualify as 
knowledge, such as our beliefs in ordinary propositions like ”I have hands.” 
But they cannot also consistently claim that they qualify as knowledge 
without trivializing the modal conditions they necessarily require for 
knowledge. While this problem implies the lack of a clear and adequate 
closeness criterion, it also points to a more serious problem, one that is not 
easily solved by a mere revision of the similarity criterion.  
The fundamental problem I am referring to is that these modal 
conditions fail to recognize certain relational features that constitute epistemic 
situations. Namely, the constitutive significance of those details or set of 
evidence that led to the formation of the subject’s belief and the state of affairs, 
or set of particular facts, that makes a given proposition true. These relational 
features are constitutive links that determine an epistemic situation.  
Modal conditions require us to track possible worlds. To do this, we 
need to hold as equal across worlds certain details or features of an actual 
epistemic situation to check if certain links are modally preserved, in a way 
that seems to forget the constitutive significance of actually established links. 
And while the link between belief and fact is usually modally preserved, 
some actually established links are not, like the link between evidence and 
belief, the link between the set of relevant facts and the truth of a proposition, 
and the link between evidence and fact.  
In a world in which the actual set of evidence is not given, the subject 
would not have formed the belief that he or she did form in the actual 
situation he or she is in, and in a world in which not all the relevant facts are 
given, the proposition would not have been true. However, as demonstrated 
in our analysis, that these links are not modally preserved does not 
necessarily mean that they do not exist in the actual situation, or in the 
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epistemic circumstance that obtains in the actual world. Sensitivity and safety 
fail when actual links which are not modally preserved is sufficient for 
knowledge. And for this reason, these modal conditions are not necessary for 
knowledge.  
 
Objections and Replies 
 
Let us now consider some possible objections to my argument.  
 
Against Constitutive Links 
  
Objection 1: Epistemic links do not exist.  
Objection 2: Epistemic links do not constitute 
epistemic situations. 
  
I reply that sensitivity and safety theorists need to assume that these 
links exist as constitutive elements of the epistemic situation or the modal 
conditions will not work. Sensitivity and safety theorists require necessarily 
that the link between belief and truth value of the proposition is modally 
preserved. But to check if this link is in fact modally preserved, they require 
us to check close possible worlds in which the proposition is false 
(sensitivity), or similar worlds in the subject believes the same proposition 
(safety). But one cannot consider a world “similar” without holding that 
while some details vary, some details are the same. Which “details” one holds 
the same and which ones vary will determine relevant epistemic features 
such as whether or not the subject believes the proposition, and whether or 
not the proposition is true. The details are linked to these features. If 
sensitivity and safety theorists do not accept this link, then identifying “close 
worlds” is going to be arbitrary. Recognizing this link is important in 
determining which details to hold the same across worlds, and which ones can 
vary. Sensitivity condition requires us to check if in ‘close worlds’ in which 
the proposition is false, the subject does not believe it. Which implies that one 
cannot hold the details that make the proposition true across worlds, one 
cannot include them in the ceteris paribus set. The details that obtain in ‘close 
worlds’ should vary in a way that makes the proposition false. However, 
whether or not the subject believes the proposition in these worlds would 
depend on which other details one holds the same. Otherwise, sensitivity 
theorists will end up arbitrarily suggesting that in ‘close worlds’ the subject 
believes or does not believe the proposition.  
The correlation between relevant details and epistemic values only 
shows how relevant these details are. They cannot be treated as trivial details 
since the epistemic situation varies with them: change the details and there is a 
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different epistemic situation. Surely a situation in which the subject truly 
believes p is different from a situation in which the subject does not believe 
false proposition p. But what varies here other than the evidence of the subject, 
the facts that obtain, the subject’s belief, the truth-value of the proposition, and 
the links in between? These are the things that make epistemic situations 
unique. 
 
Against Fallible Beliefs   
 
Objection 3: The analysis does not extend to all 
justified fallible beliefs. 
Objection 4: Fallible beliefs do not qualify as 
knowledge. 
 
I reply that sensitivity and safety do not have the mechanism to 
discriminate between justified fallible beliefs. Sensitivity and safety 
dislodged the justification condition; they do not qualify beliefs in terms of 
evidential support. The strength of one’s evidence determines the strength of 
justification. It is not necessary for sensitivity and safety that justification or the 
evidence of the subject for believing the proposition is modally preserved (that 
the subject is justified in believing the proposition in close possible worlds). 
They only require the modal preservation of the link between belief and facts. 
So while they can discriminate between lucky and unlucky beliefs (luck here 
is defined in modal terms: if the link between belief and facts is modally preserved 
then there is no luck involved in the formation of the belief), they cannot 
discriminate between unjustified, less justified, and strongly justified fallible 
beliefs. But even if we suppose that these conditions can discriminate justified 
beliefs, sensitivity and safety theorists cannot add a justification condition 
without making their views incoherent, given that some justified beliefs are 
insensitive and unsafe (for example, A-type, B-type, and C-type beliefs)—
unless they accept that sensitivity and safety are not necessary conditions for 
knowing.  
Moreover, even if sensitivity and safety theorists claim that modal 
conditions fail in A-type, B-type, and C-type cases but not in all cases of 
justified fallible beliefs, this will still imply that these conditions are not 
necessary for knowledge, since it cannot account for all knowledge cases. Now 
if they claim that all fallible beliefs do not qualify as knowledge, then that would 
defeat their arguments against skepticism, since these arguments assumed 
that our beliefs in ordinary propositions like “I have hands” are sensitive and 
safe, and these beliefs are fallible. This move will also make their views 
incoherent; attempts to solve this problem are motivated by the assumption 
that some fallible beliefs can generate knowledge, if all fallible beliefs do not 
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qualify as knowledge, then the Gettier problem is not a problem—but 
sensitivity and safety are designed to solve this problem. Finally, if all fallible 
beliefs do not qualify as knowledge then only infallible beliefs do; this will 
imply that we do not know a lot of things. I also doubt if sensitivity and safety 
theorists can successfully offer an analysis of infallible beliefs. If they suppose 
that the set of evidences and facts are equivalent sets (and they have to, 
because if they are complementary or subsets then the subject’s evidence is 
nonconclusive, and this makes the belief fallible) in cases that involve infallible 
beliefs, and if they take as equal all members of both sets, then the epistemic 
situation that will obtain in close possible worlds is exactly similar to the actual 
epistemic situation. This will make the modal conditions trivial.  
 
Against Epistemic Luck  
  
Objection 5: The analysis seems to imply that luck is 
compatible with knowledge, but lucky 
beliefs do not qualify as knowledge. 
  
I reply that if my analysis implies anything about luck it is only that 
some instances of knowledge are compatible with the sort of luck sensitivity 
and safety theorists have in mind; that is, the nonmodal preservation of the 
link between belief and fact. It does not imply that luck is always compatible 
with knowledge.  
That sensitivity and safety are not necessary for knowledge implies 
that in some instances of knowledge the link between belief and fact is not 
modally preserved. This is not inconsistent with the claim that some instances 
of knowledge are incompatible with the sort of luck sensitivity and safety 
theorists exclude in their analysis of knowledge, and the claim that lucky 
beliefs are insensitive or unsafe. My analysis could imply that it is not 
necessary to exclude the kind of luck that sensitivity and safety excludes, and 
not that knowledge is always compatible with luck; since it only shows that 
having insensitive and unsafe beliefs do not always defeat knowledge.  
Our findings could imply that while sensitivity and safety tells us 
when a belief is lucky in some sort of way, whether or not this sort of luck is 
present may sometimes have little or nothing to do with actual knowledge 
cases; that something contrary to what actually happened would have happened 
in some possible circumstance may not undo the fact that it actually happened; 
that a subject would have still believed the proposition even if it were false 
(sensitivity) or that the proposition would have easily been false even if it 
were that the subject still believes it (safety) may not change the fact that the 
subject actually believed it and that the proposition is actually true, especially 
if these things are dependent on actual links that constitute the situation that 
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actually obtains (and in most cases they are). But all I claim here is that there 
are instances of knowledge in which (1) the subject actually has a justified true 
belief, and in which (2) there is an actual link between belief and fact that is 
not modally preserved. And so, modal conditions are not necessary for 
knowledge.  
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